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Introduction
When US-Senator Chuck Schumer publicly questioned the financial health of the bank IndyMac in the summer of 2008, the bank's customers were quick to react. Within just three days, IndyMac lost USD 100 million in deposits (Los Angeles Times, 2008) ; after thirteen days and withdrawals amounting to USD 1.3 billion, the bank failed (Grind, 2012; Seabrook, 2008) . These developments were closely tracked by the Google search volume index; on the day of Schumer's announcement, the index value for the search term "IndyMac" almost doubled, rising further up to 22-fold in the following days. During the same period Washington Mutual, a struggling competitor, lost a total of USD 9.4 billion due to a bank run, even surpassing IndyMac's deposit loss. Contrary to the much publicized IndyMac incident, the Washington Mutual run was largely unnoticed by the media or the analysts (Grind, 2012) . The run did not escape the Google search volumes and Washington Mutuals share price, however: As in the IndyMac case, the search volume index for "Washington Mutual" more than doubled during the days of the run. The peak of the bank run on Tuesday, July 14, 2008 coincided with the high search volume on that same day. Two months later, Washington Mutual went through another bank run, with its peak on Thursday, These two examples provide anecdotal evidence that Google search volumes can be a valuable proxy to reflect public attention, which is generally hard to capture. It has been shown in a variety of settings that Google can be instrumented to reflect such phenomena, from influenza epidemics to unemployment forecasting (Ginsberg et al., 2008; Breyer et al., 2011; McCarthy, 2010; Bollen et al., 2011) . Whether it is useful for tracking developments in the banking industry is the subject of this paper.
Contrary to, say, a newspaper article, internet search volumes reflect a much more crowdsourced and democratic approach. Users are actively looking for something rather than consuming information passively. While a newspaper article about a specific bank must be considered worthwile reporting in the first place and, in a second step, restricted to reflecting the facts, Google search queries can capture a much wider set of information: facts as well as speculations, banking experts as well as individual savers. Google queries also give an idea of how many individuals care about a specific topic. Each search query is an uptick in the volume, translated into a rising index value. In that sense, it is similar to trading volumes in financial markets (see also Mathiesen et al. 2013 ) -except that for the majority of the banks considered in this paper, such volumes do not exist because many of them are not listed on a stock exchange. In the absence of share prices, Google data may therefore prove to be a valuable source for understanding and predicting bank failures. Providing real-time data on the popularity of a bank's name on the internet on a weekly basis, Google can help modelling short term dynamics by incorporating information that is not fully captured in balance sheet positions or macro-level variables. Such information might be important: The deposit withdrawal at Washington Mutual in July 2008 is what Iyer et al. (2013) call a non-fundamental shock: a run that cannot be justified by the balance sheet fundamentals of the bank itself or that couldn't have already been justified at an earlier point in time. At the time such a shock would have become visible in Washington Mutual's balance sheet, the bank was already under the reign of JP Morgan. Google tracked that non-fundamental shock in a timely manner. Google data is also an interesting addition to fundamentals in light of the Iyer et al. (2013) finding that large depositors tend to orient themselves to and act on (possibly non-public) regulatory actions rather than fundamentals; Google might partly capture these movements.
Three main questions are tackled in this paper. Since Google data is not available for all banks (discussed in section 3.1), a first question seeks to answer whether the availability of Google data itself correlates with the survival of an individual bank. Second, given that Google data is available, the question of how well the Google query shares track bank failures is examined.
Thirdly, I discuss the question of how indicative past changes in search volumes are when trying to predict future failures.
To answer these questions, this paper looks at 433 bank failures and 400 surviving banks in the United States in the period from January 2007 to March 2012, working with a dataset including both Google data as well as balance sheet and revenue data on the level of an individual bank.
Using an exponential duration model with a piecewise-constant hazard rate and time-varying covariates, I analyze how well Google search volumes in the United States track and predict these bank failures. Results show that while the availabilty of Google data itself has no significant effect on a bank's survival, higher Google search volumes go hand in hand with higher hazard rates. As one moves further away from the failure date, Google's predictive power dissipates.
The paper is structured as follows: in the following section, previous findings are discussed.
In the third section, the data is presented. In the fourth section, I model the failure rates of individual banks, using weekly Google time series and balance sheet positions and revenue data from the FDIC as explanatory variables. Section 5 concludes.
Previous Literature
Working with Google data to model short-term developments has been successful before. From influenza epidemics (Ginsberg et al., 2008) to tracking kidney stone incidences (Breyer et al., 2011) and monitoring suicide risks (McCarthy, 2010) , on to more economic applications in the field of unemployment (Askitas and Zimmermann, 2009; D'Amuri and Marcucci, 2010; Choi, 2009; Tefft, 2011) , inflation (Guzman, 2011) , consumer behavior (Choi and Varian, 2012; Goel et al., 2010) , consumer sentiment (Radinsky et al., 2008; Della Penna and Huang, 2009; Preis et al., 2010) and housing prices (McLaren and Shanbhogue, 2011; Wu and Brynjolfsson, 2013) . Financial markets have received some attention, too: Preis et al. (2013) quantified trading behavior using Google, Bollen et al. (2011) predict stock market movements using Twitter, Mathiesen et al. (2013) likened the statistical properties of Twitter data to the properties of trading volumes of stocks studied the correlation of Wikipedia page views and stock market movements. To my knowledge, no paper to date has used Google search volumes to predict bank failures.
While there has been a variety of empirical work studying both wider banking panics as well as individual bank failures, this literature has focussed on balance sheet positions and revenue data, looking at issues of panics, contagion and information networks (for an overview, see Gorton and Winton, 2003) . Calomiris and Mason (2003) analyze bank failures in the 1920's and 1930's using a duration model and data on individual banks as well as regional economic factors, disputing the Friedman-Schwartz argument that many bank failures resulted from unwarranted panic and finding evidence that most of the failures are justified by weak fundamentals. Saunders and Wilson (1996) look at the role of bank contagion and information in the same period, using data on deposit flows. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) make use of duration models to determine the effect of managerial inefficiency on the probability of failure and acquisition. Whalen (1991) assesses the usefulness of using proportional hazard models as early warning tool, concluding that "reasonably accurate early warning models can be built and maintained at relatively low cost."
Short term dynamics and irrational elements leading bank failures have proven difficult to account for. Regarding bank runs on individual banks and micro-level withdrawal patterns, there exists only a small literature. A recent one is Iyer and Puria (2012) , which looks at the dynamics of withdrawal patterns, deposit insurance and social networks in an Indian bank. A follow-up study (Iyer et al., 2013) looks at how depositors monitor banks, finding that regulatory agencies play an important role in the monitoring process. Other examples in the area of individual failures and information networks include Kelly and O Grada (2000) or O Grada and White (2003) .
From a macro perspective, Donaldson (1992) finds that there are periods when banking panics are more likely to occur, but that exact starting dates of such panics are unpredictable. Gorton (1988) offers empirical evidence compatible with the idea that when depositors receive information forecasting a recession, they draw on their bank accounts, knowing that they will be dissaving and anticipating the higher bank failure rate during recessions. I try to take such factors into account by including macro-level variables. to include in the sample as control observations. 4 Focussing on a random sample of surviving banks instead of using the full sample is a result of the data collection procedure: As each query on Google needs to be executed manually, collecting data on the whole set of surviving banks is infeasible.
To restore adequate proportions between failures and survivors, I weight observations accordingly when estimating the models (discussed in Section 4). To have an equal entering date for all banks at risk of failure and to avoid complications when weighting observations (also discussed in Section 4), 18 banks founded after January 1st, 2007 were dropped, of which 5 were failed banks.
For the resulting 815 banks, weekly Google search queries data and quarterly FDIC data was downloaded. The sample period covers 273 weeks or 21 quarters.
3 Note that aside from failures, there also were mergers as well as newly founded banks. 4 None of these randomly selected banks were merged into other banks or failed up to the first quarter of 2012. Sampling was done at the end of 2011 rather than at the end of the first quarter 2012 since data on the first quarter of 2012 was only added at a later stage.
Data Sources: Google Insights for Search
Weekly search query time series containing the bank's name have been executed and downloaded on "Google Insights for Search" (Google, 2012 ), Google's tool to analyze search volumes. 5 These time series reflect the query share of the bank's name in the overall search traffic categorized as "Finance" on a weekly basis. The structure and properties of Google data deserves some extra attention, as it has some non-standard restriction features.
The first restriction concerns the time horizon: Google time series go no further back than January 1, 2004 (Choi and Varian, 2012) . There is no data available before that date.
Second, Google only publishes relative numbers, not absolute search volume numbers. The numbers are relative in two dimensions. First, the query share QS ijut is the ratio of the number of queries n ijut for a given search term i and the total number of queries N jut in the selected category j in geographic area u at time t :
The second dimension concerns the time series of the query share itself. All query shares are reported relative to the maximum query share M ijuS in the selected period S multiplied by 100, which gives the Google index value GI ijut :
GI ijut is the number published by Google; all other numbers are not published. Under the assumption that internet usage is growing, a rising index value can always be interpreted as a rise in popularity for the search term. This is not true for falling values, as it is enough for the search term to be growing at a less than average rate in order for the index value to fall. Growth rates in query shares from t to t + 1 are preserved in the published relative numbers, whereas percentage point differences are not. The levels of the index values are not comparable across banks. For these reasons, only Google growth rates are used in this paper.
Third, queries are "broad matched", meaning that queries such as "IndyMac bank run" are counted in the calculation of the query index for "IndyMac", but not vice-versa. Entering less and more general search terms increases the probability that unrelated searches are captured as well.
For example, a query with the search term "forecast" may capture results related to forecasts of 5 "Google Insights for Search" has been renamed to "Google Trends" in the meantime.
economic indicators, election results or weather, whereas a query for "weather forecast tomorrow
Zurich" is much more specific and unlikely to include unrelated queries.
Fourth and linked to the third restriction, Google series for more restrictive queries are more likely not to be published at all. As mentioned above, Google publishes the index values only if the absolute number of search queries exceeds an unknow threshold (Choi and Varian, 2012) . This has two consequences: First, it restricts the sample from 815 to 210 banks for which any Google data is available. Second, within the remaining 210 banks, the absolute search volume might temporarily fall under the threshold and a value of zero is published. Since the true index value is greater than or equal to zero, using these time series can bias estimation results. Focusing only on the complete cases with uncensored Google series, on the other hand, reduces the population to 25 failing banks and 23 surviving banks. 6
[ Table 1 (such as in WashingtonFirst) have been inserted. As for the case of popular bank names, there are three institutions named "First State Bank", two "The First State Bank", two "Premier Bank", two "Summit Bank", two "The Park Avenue Bank", two "Legacy Bank", two "First National
Bank", two "Citizens National Bank" and two "Integrity Bank" in the sample. 9 In these cases, 6 When calculating percentage changes for a Google series that was censored in the preceding period, the value was set to missing.
7 Google classifies queries into about 30 categories at the top level and about 250 categories at the second level using a natural language classification engine (Choi and Varian, 2012) .
8 The exact names used for the queries are stored in the Search name variable -a missing value means that the name has been used without any modification.
9 Note that the "The" in bank names was dropped when Google data was downloaded, i.e. effectively there are five banks named "First State Bank".
identical Google query time series have to be used, as one cannot differentiate and assign unique series to each institution.
Additional Data Sources
The second major data souce for this paper is the FDIC database (Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 2011) . The FDIC provides a large set of balance sheet positions, revenue figures and other characteristics of individual banks, which a number of researchers have used for similar estimations. For the purpose of this paper, 11 variables were selected and downloaded on the bank level on a quarterly basis, the shortest time interval available. The variables can be broadly classified in the categories capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, liquidity and other factors.
The selection of the variables was guided by the selections in previous research papers estimating similar models (e.g. Cole and Gunther 1995; Calomiris and Mason 2003; Wheelock and Wilson 2000) . In addition, an indicator variable for the FDIC insurance limit raise from USD 100'000 to USD 250'000 on October 3, 2008 was defined. The FDIC dataset comprises 836 institutions.
Bloomberg serves as an additional data source from which weekly LIBOR and overnight indexed swap (OIS) time series were downloaded. 2010 US Census data (United States Census Bureau, 2010) was used to define urban area dummy variables on the US county level.
Variables and Summary Statistics
Information on bank failures is taken from the FDIC, which lists failures in its failed banks list.
The failure date is defined as the closing date that the FDIC lists on that same list. The FDIC has some discretion when it comes to the exact date of the closing, and therefore to exploit the weekend days to wind down a bank (i.e. when banks are closed), most of these closing dates are on a Friday. For my purposes, this means I can aggregate these closing dates to a weekly measure with little loss of information. The failure time is then defined as the week into which the closing date falls. Table 2 Summary statistics are presented in Table 3 . Aside from the Google variable, several balance sheet variables are listed, which can be roughly categorized into a capitalisation variable (capital), asset quality variables (troubled assets, commercial real estate, residential real estate), earnings (net income), liquidity (large CDs, insdep, securities) and miscellaneous factors (insider loans, holding company, entering age, urban). A description of the variables can be found in Table   A1 in the appendix. The reported values in the table are averages over the period starting in January 2007 to March 2012 or the respective failure date where in a first step, the average over all periods is taken for each bank, and then the average is taken over all banks in the group (i.e.
failures/survivors). The upper third includes all banks, the middle third only banks where Google data is available, and the bottom third only banks with uncensored Google series.
Even if averaged over time, survivors and failures differ in some of the variables, as can be seen by the stars indicating a difference in the Wilcoxon rank-sum test at the one percent significance level. Differences attenuate somewhat as one restricts the sample to banks having uncensored Google series, which is the sample main results will be based on. The differences in capital ratio or large cash deposits, for example, are not significant anymore. If you exclude the two largest failures, Washington Mutual and IndyMac, from the sample, the difference in gross assets is not significant anymore either. Surviving banks differ from their failing counterparts with respect to troubled assets, net income, securities and age.
[ Table 3 about here.]
In terms of changes in Google query shares during the last weeks prior to failure, other bank failures resemble the pattern of Washington Mutual seen in the introduction. Figure 2 shows the weekly mean of the growth rate of Google query shares for the names of the 25 failed banks with uncensored Google series, compared to the corresponding means of the 23 surviving banks. To calculate the value for the control group, control group values were averaged in the corresponding week to failure for the failing bank. In a second step, these values were averaged over all failing banks. Values for failing banks remain on a low level up to five weeks before failure. From then on, there is a slight upward trend in rates, up to about one week before failure, when they spike and remain high in the weeks of and after the failure. Shortly after the failure, rates drop sharply.
Meanwhile, changes in query shares for surviving banks stay constant.
[ This is important as the baseline hazard, i.e. the hazard common to all banks, is likely to change over time, especially during the financial crisis. To account for the changes in the hazard rate over time and work with time-varying covariates, the dataset is split into 273 weekly episodes.
The baseline hazard is modelled using time dummies as well as macro-variables (the LOIS spread). With respect to time dummies, three specifications will be used. The first involves splitting the 2007 to 2012 into just two subperiods: one before and one after the raise of the FDIC insurance limit from USD 100'000 to USD 250'000 in October 2008. This intervention is mainly an intervention to prevent potential bank runs from depositors; whether the hazard changes can be directly tested on the corresponding dummy variable for the intervention. A second specification uses yearly time dummies, changing the baseline hazard every year. A third specification uses quarterly dummies. As an alternative to the piecewise-constant hazard model and as a robustness check, I also estimate a Cox proportional hazard model. Note that in this case, the baseline hazard function is completely unspecified.
In the piecewise-constant hazard model, the hazard rate is a step function specified as
whereθ t is the interval-specific baseline hazard common to all banks and λ(x it , z i , w t ) is the bankspecific hazard component in period t. x it is a vector including individual time-varying covariates, z i contains individual time-constant covariates and w t contains common, time-varying elements at time t. The interval-specific baseline hazard is equivalent to including a period-specific dummy variables in the overall hazard.
In the case of two subperiods with x it = x i1 and w t = w 1 if t < s and x it = x i2 and w t = w 2 if t ≥ s , the corresponding survivor function is given by (see Jenkins, 2005 )
Note that Google data varies on a weekly basis, while balance sheet data varies only quarterly.
As mentioned in the data section, the sample consists of all banks that failed in the period from January 2007 to March 2012, plus a random sample of surviving banks. While in the sample of 815 banks, more than half of them fail within the roughly eight years covered, these failures represent only about five percent of the whole bank population of 8,681 institutions in December 2006. This choice-based sampling therefore needs to be accounted for by weighting observations accordingly (Lancaster, 1992) . Individual likelihood contributions are weighted by P/Q, where P represents the population fraction of failing institutions, and Q represents the sample fraction of failing institutions (correspondingly, (1−P ) and (1−Q) are the weights for surviving institutions). Accordingly, failing banks get a lower weight than surviving banks. I reported both the absolute number of failures as well as the weighted failures in the result tables.
Results
In this section, I seek to answer the three questions raised in the introduction. The empirical hazard rate including all 815 banks is displayed in Figure 4 . One can see that the hazard rate varies with time, peaking after week 170, or at the beginning of 2010. The result tables are split into five columns; the model in the first column is using Google as the only explanatory variable. The second column shows results for a piecewise-constant hazard rate model with two subperiods (pre-and post FDIC insurance limit raise), followed by the piecewise-constant hazard models with yearly and quarterly dummies. The last column shows the results of the Cox proportional hazards model. The bottom of the table specifies whether the Google data availability variable (Dummy) or the Google growth variable for the percentage change from the last period (Growth) was used. The table also lists the total number of banks, the absolute number of failures, and the weighted number of failures (which is around five percent of the total number of banks, as outlined in the previous section). Note that the majority of the explanatory variables are roughly bounded between 0 and 100, as they are percentages of gross assets. The tables report coefficients (as opposed to hazard ratios). A change in X k changes the overall hazard by ∂θ(t,X t ,Z,W t ) ∂X kt = θ(t, X t , Z, W t )β k or increases the hazard by 100(exp(β k ) − 1) percent (approximatly 100β k percent). A negative coefficient decreases the hazard accordingly.
[ Figure 4 about here.] Table 4 shows results using the Google dummy variable. The coefficient for the Google variable is positive, but remains statistically insignificant in all five models -whether Google data is available is not a significant predictor whether a bank fails or not. Capital has the anticipated, large negative effect on the hazard rate. Troubled assets positions increase the hazard rate as one would expect, while securities -which can serve as collateral when lending money -decrease the hazard, as do large cash deposits. Interestingly, the coefficient for the variable insdep, the interaction between the large deposits ratio and the FDIC insurance limit raise dummy, is positive, implying a relatively higher hazard for banks with large deposits after the FDIC intervention. Note that the coefficient on the FDIC intervention (the subperiod dummy) counteracts the effect with a negative coefficient of about the same magnitude (not shown in the table). Finally, coefficients on commercial real estate and urban are positive, while the coefficient for holding companies is negative. The remaining effects are not statistically significant.
[ Table 4 about here.] Table 5 presents the main results using only banks with uncensored Google series. Generally, effects increase the more flexible the baseline hazard is specified, with the exception of the macrovariable LOIS, whose effect is increasingly captured by the more flexible baseline hazard time dummies as one moves from the left to the right of the table. Coefficients are in line with expecations. In all specifications, the coefficient on the Google variable is significant, raising the hazard rate between approximately 2.4 and 4.8 percent, which is roughly comparable to the coefficient on troubled assets. Capital and securities have the largest effects, both reducing the hazard rate. The interaction variable between large deposits and the FDIC insurance limit raise still dampens the hazard-reducing effect of the introduction of the FDIC raise for banks with a high percentage of large deposits. A possible interpretation may be that depositors with accounts holding between USD 100'000 and USD 250'000 profited from the raise, but customers holding deposits in excess of USD 250'000 might have interpreted the intervention as a warning sign.
Further, the more a bank was invested in residential real estate the lower its hazard, which may be counterintuitive given the financial crisis has its roots in the real estate sector. Lastly, it should be noted that the significant effect in assets is mainly driven by the failures of the three largest banks; excluding them from the analysis leads to statistically insignificant coefficients on assets (not shown in the table).
[ Table 5 about here.]
The appendix further lists results including censored Google series in Table A9 as well as results ignoring weighting. The coefficients confirm the results shown above. The coefficient on the Google variable is attenuated towards zero when using censored Google series, which is expected as falls in the Google Index are overstated in the censored case. In the bottom half of Table 6 , the Google variable covers the accumulated growth rate over a longer period, from a 2-week period up to a 5-week period. The results confirm the previous statements: Results are mainly driven by the Google growth values in the week of the failure; adding additional weeks and lengthening of the time period barely changes the estimated coefficients.
[ Table 6 about here.]
Conclusion
Washington Mutual was still considered well capitalized shortly before its closure (Grind, 2012) , but the situation changed rapidly in mid-September. Within a few weeks, a well-capitalized bank -which admittedly did have problems with its mortgages -had to be shut down, as closing the bank was apparently the only option to stop the ongoing run on deposits. Once a bank run is kicked off, a vicious feedback-loop is started and withdrawals spread like a virus. As the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model shows, one ends up in an equilibrium where it becomes rational for every agent to pull out their funds; even deposit insurance may prove ineffective at this point (Iyer and Puria, 2012; Grind, 2012) .
Such bank failures are hard to predict. Empirical research analyzing the survival and survival time of banks by making use of their balance sheets provides insights, but these studies have their limits when it comes to the timing of the failure. Other research focussing on single banks helps understanding the dynamics during a bank run, but cannot explain when or why the bank run occurred in the first place. Google data can provide additional insights and accuracy in this field. As this study demonstrates, Google search volumes start rising up to two weeks before failure, indicating increased attention on the internet for an individual bank. By capturing short term dynamics that cannot be reflected in quarterly balance sheet and revenue data, Google queries can be a valuable improvement to more traditional predictions, especially when it comes to the timing of the failure. Compared to other instruments used to capture publicly available information, Google has the advantage of being "democratically" weighted rather than binary or influenced by other variables, reflecting the spread of information more accurately. While it is hard to know how many readers read a newspaper article, a rising Google index can always be translated into more people being concerned. The year 2012 covers only the first quarter of the year.
The years 2004, 2005, 2006 are excluded from the analysis. Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% * * : 1% * * * : 0.1%
Source: FDIC
1 Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered on subject).
2 Balance sheet and revenue variables are all expressed in percentages, i.e. are roughly in a range from 0 to 100. 3 Google changes are expressed in percentages, i.e. one percent is 1, onehundred percent are 100. 4 Episodes are split on a weekly basis. 5 The Cox PH model uses the Breslow method for ties. 1 Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered on subject).
2 Balance sheet and revenue variables are all expressed in percentages, i.e. are roughly in a range from 0 to 100. 3 Google changes are expressed in percentages, i.e. one percent is 1, onehundred percent are 100. 4 Episodes are split on a weekly basis. 5 The Cox PH model uses the Breslow method for ties. Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% * * : 1% * * * : 0.1%
1 Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered on subject). 2 Balance sheet and revenue variables are all expressed in percentages, i.e. are roughly in a range from 0 to 100. 3 Google changes are expressed in percentages, i.e. one percent is 1, onehundred percent are 100. 4 Episodes are split on a weekly basis. Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% * * : 1% * * * : 0.1%
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1 Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered on subject). 2 Balance sheet and revenue variables are all expressed in percentages, i.e. are roughly in a range from 0 to 100. 3 Google changes are expressed in percentages, i.e. one percent is 1, onehundred percent are 100. 4 Episodes are split on a weekly basis. 5 The Cox PH model uses the Breslow method for ties. Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% * * : 1% * * * : 0.1%
